PATROL AND PERSUADE

A follow-up investigation to 110 Overseas



safeguard DEFENDERS

Executive Summary

More stations uncovered (Chapter 2)

In addition to the previously revealed 54 stations, Safeguard Defenders documented the declared establishment by local Chinese public security authorities of at least **48 additional Chinese Overseas Police Service Stations,** bringing the total to 102 with an overall claimed in-country presence in 53 countries.

More police jurisdictions operating stations uncovered (Chapter 2)

The vast majority of the newly documented stations have been set up starting in 2016 by two newly discovered local Chinese jurisdictions: Nantong and Wenzhou. At this point, **four different local police jurisdictions** have been exposed and shown to have set up such overseas police service centers. This directly refutes PRC authorities' statements that the operations started in response to the Covid 19 pandemic.

Stations' involvement in more "persuasion to return" operations uncovered (Chapter 4)

New information shows at least one illegal "persuasion to return" operation run through the Wenzhou station in Paris, France; and at least 80 cases where the Nantong overseas police system assisted in the capture and/or persuasion to return operation. This is in addition to already exposed operations in Spain and Serbia. This contradicts PRC authorities' statements that the stations are merely providing administrative services.

Police jurisdictions' "hiring" of staff for its overseas stations revealed (Chapter 5)

One police jurisdiction claims to have hired 135 people to manage their *initial* 21 stations. The language used, hire "聘请", can best be understood as "contracted, hired or appointed" in this context. Another jurisdiction (Wenzhou) uses similar language announcing the hiring or appointment of 19 persons early after the launch of their first stations. A certificate for a Stockholm "overseas liaison officer" for its station further confirms such accounts.

Official police stations set up with cooperation of host governments (Chapter 3)

PRC statements claim part of the stations in Africa and Asia have been set up in explicit agreement with the host country. A 2015 Ministry of Public Security bilateral agreement on joint police patrols with the Italian government appears to have contributed directly to the later establishment of European "pilot" stations in Milan in 2016 (by Wenzhou police) and 2018 (by Qingtian police).

PATROL AND PERSUADE A follow-up investigation to **110 Overseas**

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Keywords: China, human rights, criminal justice, transnational repression, long-arm policing

First published December 2022

Ch 1. Background

On September 12, 2022, Safeguard Defenders released its investigation <u>110 Overseas – China's</u> <u>Transnational Policing Gone Wild</u>, a follow-up to its much larger <u>January 2022 report Involuntary</u> <u>Returns</u> documenting the PRC's illicit methods to harass, threaten, intimidate and force targets to return to China for persecution. The investigation documented the existence of 54 clandestine Chinese Overseas Police Service Stations around the world and has since made global headlines. Investigations have been launched by law enforcement agencies in at least twelve countries and the issue has been raised at the highest level, including the bilateral meeting between Canadian PMTrudeau and CCP Secretary General Xi Jinping during the Bali G20. This follow-up investigation has been made possible also thanks to the work of individual journalists in targeted countries.



Safeguard Defenders reiterates that all documentation is exclusively based on open-source accounts published by Chinese authorities or State/Party media. The new evidence contained in this follow-up investigation includes a central government source praising the set-up of the Nantong overseas stations, as well as documented presence of and collaboration with the Chinese Consulates or Embassies in host countries.

We urge any reader to first familiarize themselves with the original investigation <u>110 Overseas</u> before reading this.

Ch 2. Chinese Overseas Police Service Stations

In addition to the previously reported 54 stations, Safeguard Defenders documented the declared establishment by Chinese authorities of at least 48 additional Chinese Overseas Police Service Stations by local-level Public Security Bureaus, with an overall claimed incountry **presence in at least 53 countries via 102 overseas police service stations**. These include 29 stations set up by **Nantong** Public Security Bureau starting February 2016; 12 stations set up by **Wenzhou** Public Security Bureau starting with its "pilot" station in Milan, Italy, in May 2016; six additional stations for the previously reported **Qingtian** Public Security Bureau starting with its "pilot" station in Milan, Italy, in 2018; and one additional station for the **Fuzhou** Public Security Bureau.



Map 1. Chinese police jurisdictions

Table 1. List of Chinese police jurisdictions and location of their overseas police service centers

- v indicates exact location unknown.
- Red indicates newly revealed stations, and/or police jurisdictions in China running a system of overseas police service stations.
- Black indicates already revealed stations and police jurisdictions in China running them.

COUNTRY	NANTONG	WENZHOU	QINGTIAN	FUZHOU
Angola	\checkmark			
Argentina		Buenos Aires		Buenos Aires
Australia	✓	Sydney		
Austria			Vienna	
Bangladesh	✓			
Brazil		✓	Rio de Janeiro	Sao Paolo
Brunei				Bandar Seri Begawan
Cambodia	✓		Phnom Penh	
Canada	\checkmark	Vancouver		Toronto 1
Canada				Toronto 2
Canada				Toronto 3
Chile	✓			Viña del Mar
Colombia			Bogotà	
Cuba	✓			
Czech Republic			Prague	Prague
Ecuador	✓		Guayaquil	Quito
Ethiopia	✓			
France		Paris	Paris	Paris 1
France				Paris 2
Germany			Frankfurt	
Greece				
Hungary			Budapest	
Indonesia	\checkmark			
Ireland				Dublin
Israel	\checkmark			
Italy		Milan	Bolzano	Prato
Italy		Prato	Firenze	
Italy		Rome	Milan	
Italy			Prato	
Italy			Rome	
Italy			Sicily	
Italy			Venice	
Japan	✓			Tokyo
Lesotho				Maseru
Madagascar	Antanarivo			

COUNTRY	NANTONG	WENZHOU	QINGTIAN	FUZHOU
Mongolia				Ulaanbataar
Mozambique				
Myanmar	Yangon			
Namibia	✓			
New Zealand	✓			
Nigeria	✓			Benin City
Sudan	✓			
Panama	✓			
Peru	✓			
Portugal			Lisbon	Porto
Portugal				Madeira
Romania	✓			
Russia	✓			
Serbia	✓		Belgrade	
Slovak Republic			Bratislava	
South Africa	✓	Johannesburg		Johannesburg
South Korea	✓			
Spain			Barcelona	Barcelona 1
Spain			Madrid	Barcelona 2
Spain			Santiago de Compostela	Madrid 1
Spain			Valencia	Madrid 2
Spain				Valencia
Sweden			Stockholm	
Tanzania			Dar es Salaam	
The Netherlands			Amsterdam	Rotterdam
UAE	\checkmark	Dubai		
Ukraine			Odessa	
United Kingdom				London 1
United Kingdom				London 2
United Kingdom				Glasgow
USA	\checkmark	Los Angeles		New York
USA		New York		
Uzbekistan				Syr Darya
Vietnam	\checkmark			
Zambia	✓			

Central Guidance

The scope of both this and Safeguard Defenders' original investigation <u>110</u> <u>Overseas</u> is limited to the overseas police service stations set up by local Chinese Public Security services in foreign locations with large overseas Chinese communities hailing from those local jurisdictions. While these are not directly run by central authorities, some statements and policies are starting to show a clearer guidance from the central government in encouraging their establishment and policies. Furthermore, as in the original <u>110</u> *Overseas*, examples of persuasion to return operations run through the stations include several targets under the central authorities' Fox Hunt campaign.

Furthermore, alongside the clandestine stations, official stations involving central government bodies are also being established across Asia and Africa with the cooperation of host governments. While not the scope of this follow-up report, given the occasional overlap or use of such centrally guided efforts in the (future) set-up of locally run stations, as well as for further investigative purposes of law enforcement agencies, their presence merits some attention, as presented below.




This October 2017 *Economic Daily* article on global security governance, Sky Net and Fox Hunt, published on the **official website of the PRC's State Council**, states:

> "In South Africa, Chinese police liaison officers [official Embassy personnel, ndr.] have united with major local overseas Chinese associations to establish a Chinese Community and Police Cooperation Center. When Chinese and overseas Chinese encounter problems, they can report to the Chinese Community and Police Cooperation Center, and then the center will communicate and coordinate with the local police to solve the problem. **At present, nine Police Cooperation Centers have been established in South Africa and extended to Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania and other countries.**"

Matt Schrader first reported on the set-up of thirteen South African Chinese Community and Police Cooperation Centers in agreement with South African authorities in a January 2019

Jamestown China Brief, highlighting the direct link with the [Chinese Communist Party organ] United Front Work Department and political influence operations. In his report he also highlights how "both the PRC embassy and the centers are open about embassy support for the centers, in the form of money and personnel," and how they appear to form part of a national endeavor:

> "As explained in Chinese on their website homepage, they are part of a global network of "Overseas Chinese Service Centers" (OCSC) established in 2014 by the PRC State Council Overseas Chinese Affairs Office. (The Overseas Chinese Affairs office was merged into the CCP's United Front Work Department earlier this year.) In 2014, Qiu Yuanping (裘援平), the then-head of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, announced plans to establish such centers in 60 countries around the world (Center for China and Globalization, March 19 2014)."





The Jamestown Foundation, 5 January 2019.

To date, <u>the OCSC website lists</u> addresses and contact details for 46 centers in 40 different countries (<u>China Qiaowang</u>; see above reported figure from Matt Schrader's 2019 Jamestown brief), while <u>a January 5, 2018, article</u> lists 60 "China Aid Centers" across five continents:


- North America Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver, San Francisco, Houston, Minnesota, Nebraska;
- **Europe** Madrid, Milan, Rome, Prato, Paris, Dublin, London;
- Central and South America Suriname, Peru, Sao Paulo (Brazil), Chile, Panama, Argentina, Venezuela;
- Africa Angola, Johannesburg (South Africa), Nigeria, Cape Town (South Africa), Tanzania;
- Asia Yangon (Myanmar), Cambodia, Kazakhstan, Philippines, Tokyo (Japan), Laos, Kyrgyzstan, Chiang Mai (Thailand), Korea, Mandalay (Myanmar), Sri Lanka, Nagoya (Japan), Thailand, Ulaanbaatar (Mongolia);
- Oceania Papua New Guinea, Australia, Auckland (New Zealand), Brisbane (Australia), Fiji.

The article further cites as their tasks:

"In 2014, the Overseas Chinese Office of the State Council supported overseas Chinese groups to set up 'Chinese service centers' in cities where overseas Chinese live, providing basic services such as emergency relief, integration training, legal aid, and poverty alleviation."

This seemingly further distinguishes the OCSC's from the *Chinese Community and Police Cooperation Centers* cited on the <u>State Council's</u> <u>website in 2017</u>. Therefore, Safeguard Defenders has **not** included this full list of <u>cited OCSC's</u> in its above "Chinese overseas police station" overview list. However, given that the published address list does on occasion overlap with some of the previously retrieved addresses for Chinese Overseas Police Service Stations (<u>see for</u> <u>example Dublin, Ireland</u>), and more recent articles adopt language pointing to the next step for a transformation of "service centers" into "bridges for police linkage" (see for example <u>this July</u> <u>2022 China Radio International article regarding</u> <u>the United States</u>), further investigation by local law enforcement authorities in cited countries is warranted.

Map 2. Countries with known vs newly revealed stations



Nantong "Police and Overseas Chinese Linkage Service Centers"



The above-cited October 2017 Economic Daily article on global security governance, Skynet and Fox Hunt, published on the official website of the PRC's State Council, further states:

> "In China, relevant protection models have been under constant exploration and innovation, among which the Nantong Domestic and Overseas Police and Overseas Chinese Linkage Service Center. In February 2016, the Nantong Public Security Bureau took the lead in establishing the first policeoverseas Chinese linkage service center

in the country. While strengthening early warning and prevention, as well as expanding international police cooperation, the Nantong police has used the strength and resources of INTERPOL to continuously strengthen the detection of cross-border cases and form a strong deterrent to criminals who violate the legitimate interests of Nantong enterprises and personnel. According to statistics, in 2016, the Nantong police went overseas to coordinate and organize the detection of more than 20 cases, and transferred 22 suspects for prosecution."



On 13 June 2017, Nantong police stated had

"seized the construction opportunities of the Belt and Road Initiative" and had "licensed and issued liaison cards" for overseas subcenters in Sudan, Namibia, Canada, Japan, Panama, Australia and New Zealand, citing sub-centers set up in a total of 20 countries so far, including in "Angola, Zambia, Ecuador, Romania, Cambodia, Myanmar, South Africa, Indonesia, Chile, Madagascar, Nigeria, Serbia, the United Arab Emirates and other countries."



我苏阿讯"中心每天推送安全信息,24小时提供咨询服务,我们心里更踏实了。""自从 加入这个大家庭,我们得到的帮助更多了,希望中心在法律服务和打击犯罪上再给予更多支 持。"4月29日下午,南通市海内外警侨联动服务中心召开首次年度工作会议,并为埃塞俄比 亚分中心,秘鲁工作站和孟加拉工作站授牌。

Ourjiangsu.com, 29 April 2020.



会上,南通市副市长、市公安局局长张轩视频连线部分海外站点、询问意见建议时,以 色列工作站徐巍松和寨尔维亚分中心秦金生感慨说,南通市海内外警侨联动服务中心对他们 在外的正常生产和生活秩序提供了保障支撑。

On 29 April 2020,

"the Nantong Police and Overseas Chinese Linkage Service Centers at home and abroad held its first annual work meeting and awarded licenses to the **Ethiopian** branch center, **Peru** workstation and **Bangladesh** workstation." During the meeting, Zhang Xuan, deputy mayor of Nantong City and director of the Municipal Public Security Bureau, made a video connection to some overseas sites, with reported contributions from "Xu Weisong from the **Israeli** workstation and Qin Jinsheng from the Serbia branch".



成立于2016年3月的南通市海内外警侨联动服务中心,一直致力于为南通"走出去"企业 和人员提供安全保障和优质服务。4年来,先后在28个国家和地区成立了海外分中心及工作 站。尤其是2019年,中心共走访"走出去"企业200余家,发布投资指南和预警提示400余次, 为企业解决难题100余件,帮助打击处理海外违法犯罪人员43名,同时出台了国际110报警求 助热线接待和突发事件应急处置、求助规范,成立了海外案(事)件处置专家队,进一步延 伸海外安全保护触角。

Ourjiangsu.com, 29 April 2020.

According to the same <u>2020 account of the</u> first annual work meeting,

and regions. Especially in 2019, it [...] helped crack down on 43 overseas criminals."

"overseas sub-centers and workstations have been established in 28 countries

"警侨联动"织密为侨服务防护
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喻迎春
系,摸清侨情信息,及时掌握动态,快速作出
反应。以侨商会为依托,在美国、俄罗斯、加
拿大、罗马尼亚、塞尔维亚、纳米比亚、安哥
拉、南非和埃塞俄比亚等16个侨胞侨商相对集
中的国家设立海外联络服务站点,落实联络人
员,搭建沟通联系、应急救助平台。
ese Times, 17 September 2021.

A September 2021 article adds:

"Relying on the Overseas Chinese Chamber of Commerce, Nantong Police and Overseas Chinese Linkage stations were set up in 16 countries where overseas Chinese and

Chin

overseas Chinese businessmen are relatively concentrated, such as the **United States**, **Russia**, Canada, Romania, Serbia, Namibia, Angola, South Africa and Ethiopia [...]" 近年来,海安市李堡镇一批批村民走出国门,走出一条条境外打拼之 路,足迹遍布美国、澳大利亚、新加坡、新西兰、安哥拉、以色列、韩国等 20多个国家和地区。为李堡"走出去"企业和人员提供安全保障,李堡镇统 战办和镇派出所牵头,联合海安出入境管理大队,于2022年5月成立李堡镇 警侨驿站。



In <u>May 2022, Libao Town</u> (Haian County, Nantong City) followed the higher-ups' lead:

"[...] the Libao Town United Front Work Office and Town Police took the lead [...] to establish the Libao overseas Chinese police service center in May 2022. [...] exploring a new model of '**using overseas Chinese to** govern overseas Chinese, and police and overseas Chinese linkage'. [...] At present, representatives of overseas Chinese and overseas students have been hired in the United States, Australia, **South Korea** and other places as overseas liaison officers to cooperate with domestic officers both internally and externally."

Wenzhou Police Overseas Service Stations



On 29 August 2019, <u>China News Service</u> reported the Wenzhou Public Security Bureau's establishment of a May 2016 "pilot" of a Police and Overseas Chinese contact point in **Milan**, Italy.

温州警侨海外联络点让侨胞办事省钱省时省力

2017年11月29日 15:03 | 来源:中央统战部网站

分享到: 🗐 🚼 😰 🚮 😰 🙏 🞑

创设"内+外"互动平台

内外设点。2016年5至8月间,分别在华侨侨胞主要"集聚地"法国、意大利,先后设立 巴黎、米兰、普拉托3个"警侨之家海外联络点",在温州丽岙重点侨乡派出所设立警侨工 作室,为广大归侨、侨眷提供活动场所。网络连线。在海外联络点和国内工作室,专门 购置视频通讯办公设备,为侨搭"面对面"服务平台,同步建立"警侨之家(法国-温州瓯 海)、警侨之家(意大利北部-温州瓯海)、警侨之家(意大利中部-温州瓯海)"等3 个工作联系微信群,提供"点对点"在线咨询、在线预审服务。

Central United Front Work Department website, 29 November 2017.

According to the <u>Central United Front Work</u> <u>Department website</u>, by August 2016 the Wenzhou Public Security Bureau had set up three such Police and Overseas Chinese contact points, adding **Paris** (France) and **Prato** (Italy).



依托互联网技术,"温警在线"平台能与海外联络点实现音像同步、在线互动,只需要登录手机平台,就 能办理温州公安的"零跑腿"事项。而对必须"线下办"的业务,办事人员也可以在海外联络站视频确认后,再 委托国内关系人线下办理。

温州市公安局行政审批处处长胡绍耀告诉记者,首批推出65个办事项目,海外的侨胞就可以实现一次都 不用跑,不需要回国再来办理。

目前,温州公安局已在温哥华、悉尼、巴黎、纽约等11个城市设立了20个联络点,让更多人享受"最多 跑一次"改革的红利。

New Blue Network Zhejiang Network Radio and Television Station, 13 August 2018.

By August 2018, the Wenzhou Municipal Public Security Bureau had opened <u>a reported twenty</u> overseas police contact points in eleven cities, including **Rome, Sydney, Los Angeles, New** York, Vancouver, Brazil, Buenos Aires, Dubai and Johannesburg. 二、设立"管侨磷秘"。打造以"爱心、民心、侨心"为主题的"三心警务"。一是推出"最多 第一次"政策。2016年5月、温州市职海区公安局经过多年的实践、率全省之先在雨带设立"驱海警 你工作室"曼"管侨在线",并在雨齿华侨主要集聚地——法国巴等、意大利米兰、普拉托设立3 个"海外联络点",聘调19名雨齿盾桥桥提任"海外联络官"。先后实体办理各类事项200人次、提 《各类咨询2000余次、真正实现了华侨办事"不用回国、不跨辖区、不需出门"的工作目标、打造 了"最多题一次"的国际版。也为全市"警侨在线"进行了路场样板。"是打造"侨心最多"路离晶 跳。以专业化为引领、多指并举,在保障上下功夫,确保警侨服务品牌做大做强。强化组织保障,定 位专业化、成立由公安局领导牵头,主要业务大队参与的工作参班,并由分局就专项经费10万元,在 耐伤所内建成面积约50余平方的"警侨之家",安排桥多工作经验非富的很繁担任专斯咨询人员,奠 定品牌基础。三是包括"为侨政务"或指导色。既海公安以侨乡的满意度为导向,在雨齿涌出所设立 出入境受理点,做实"护籍、出入境"双窗口,做优"线上、线下"双甲台、实现"自毁受理、一尚 多能、流动服务。在线语词"等成合性服务,自晒后流出所出入境受理点设立以来办理出入境证件 6000余件、极大地调定了你很办证需。

Zhejiang Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese, 7 April 2021.

一、建立"海外联络员制度"。2009年、温州市文成县法院首创特邀海外调解制度试点,通过 面对面视频办理相关业务成为可能,文成法院与意大利米兰通过运程视频为侨胞提供送程公证和司法 调解服务,取得成功。随后, 瓯海区、瑞安市、鹿城区等重点侨乡相继依托海外温籍侨团组织开通运 程视频服务, 服务内容由单一的公证和司法调解服务增加到递鉴司法公证、警侨、检侨服务(含户籍 管理、出入境、车辆管理等80多项业务)、纠纷调解、法律政策法规咨询等公共服务。该平台已在法 国、意大利、西班牙、葡萄牙、德国、荷兰、巴西、俄罗斯、南非、阿联酋、澳门11个国家(地区)14 个城市设立了16个海外服务点,温籍华侨人口覆盖率达82.5%、已办理事项和答复咨询7900多件。 每年处理的关于华侨华人民事、商事等案件500余件,年间最多达到了900余件。2009年至2020年 12月末,已受理相关案件5500余件。

According to a post by the Zhejiang Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese in April 2021,

outlining four different types of overseas services being set up and which explicitly distinguishes between the establishment of its "Chinese Overseas Police Stations" and its service "overseas liaison system", the latter category — which appears closer in nature to the OCSC's flagged by Matt Schrader in 2019 and is therefore not included in the main station overview list — reached a total of sixteen contact points in fourteen cities across eleven countries, including France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Germany, Netherlands, Brazil, Russia, South Africa, UAE and Macau.

Qingtian Police Overseas Service Stations

Safeguard Defenders' prior investigation 110 Overseas already included the Qingtian Public Security Bureau's establishment of overseas police service centers. Since September, additional stations have been uncovered:

青田县人民检察院意大利海外联络站站长、意大利西部六省一市华侨华 人联谊会会长叶先平表示,青田县人民检察院始终聚焦华侨华人困难需求,

*此次在意大利普拉托、西部六省一市、罗马、波尔查诺、米兰、西西 里等6个华侨华人聚集地设立分站,是青田县人民检察院对意大利海外联络站

坚决维护华侨华人切身利益,在意大利率先设立海外联络站,他很荣幸担任



中新网丽水12月2日电(记者 周禹龙 实习生 施紫楠 通讯员 季旭伟)2日 记者获悉,为更好开展工作,浙江青田检察院在意大利6个青田籍华人华侨聚 集地,设立了6家海外联络站分站。 工作开展的高度认可,这是一种荣耀,更是一份责任,意大利海外联络站及 分站将一如既往地以认真对待、真诚服务、及时沟通的态度做好联络工作, 真心实意为当地侨胞服务。"叶先平说。

第一任站长。



China News Network, 2 December 2018.

In December 2018, China News Service reported on the Qingtian Procuratorates' establishment of six overseas liaison sub-stations in Italy: in **Prato**, Rome, Milan, **Bolzano** and **Sicily**.



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意大利威尼斯警侨驿站授牌成立



Zhejiang Qingtian Media Group, 6 April 2019.



会上,与会人员现得了青田公安宣传片,听取了青田县公安局党委委员、政治处主任刘建国所作 的警係驿站运行情况报告。威尼斯、巴塞罗耶、阿姆斯特丹、瓜亚基尔等相关代表介绍了警侨驿站运 营情况并提出了相关意见。

<u>On 6 April 2019,</u>

"Political Commissar Liu Guangxian read out the list of newly established Overseas Police Service Centers, and together with other members of the party committee, awarded licenses to six newly established Overseas Police Service Centers including Venice, Phnom Penh, and **Bogotá**. Jiang Xiongxin, honorary chairman of the Overseas Chinese Association in Venice, attended the awarding ceremony on behalf of the Venice Overseas Chinese Police Service Center. [...] At the meeting, the participants watched the Qingtian public security promotional video, and listened to the report on the operation of the Overseas Chinese Police Service Center by Liu Jianguo, member of the Party Committee of the Qingtian County Public Security Bureau and Director of the Political Department. Relevant representatives from Venice, Barcelona, **Amsterdam**, Guayaquil, etc. introduced the operation of the Overseas Chinese Police Service Center and put forward relevant opinions." 首页>政务公开>政府信息公开>政府信息公开>社會部队、政法系统>會田县公安局>规划计划

青田县公安局2020年工作总结

索引号: 00265226/2021-94607 发布机构: 青田县公安局 发布时间: 2021-02-09 14:51:20

五是聚焦"深化改革",彰显转色工作创新能力。深化"枫桥式公安派出 所"创建,在鹤城派出所打造集办事服务、政策宣传、远程帮扶、内外协同、 海外联调等内容的"警侨E超市"品牌,确保为民服务高效便捷,且鹤城派出所 被市公安局确定为全市10个省级"枫桥式公安派出所"重点培育对象,并在全 市创建工作亮晒会上获得第一名的成绩;深化"最多跑一次"改革,推进"金牌 窗口"创建工作,局出入境管理大队办证中心和温溪派出所办事服务中心获得 全市"金牌窗口"称号;为进一步提升为侨服务水平,在全球15个国家21座城 市设立"警侨驿站"海外服务中心,该项工作被省公安厅列入丽水市唯一入选 县域改革试点项目;优化事项集成改革,全面梳理涉及户口管理、车驾管 等"一件事"业务流程,让群众乐享更多改革红利。

Qingtian Government, 9 February 2021.

An <u>official summary of the Qingtian County</u> <u>Public Security Bureau's 2020 work report</u> further confirms that by that year "Overseas Chinese Police Service Centers have been set up in 21 cities in 15 countries around the world."

Fuzhou Police Overseas Service Stations



In May of this year, the Chinese-language <u>AfricanTimes reported</u> that as of May 23rd, the Johannesburg Service Station of Fuzhou Police and Overseas Chinese Affairs – established within the South African Chinese Community and Police Cooperation Center (*see Central Guidance*) – was officially launched.

Ch 3. Host Country Complicity

Article 4 Establishment of a consular post

1.A consular post may be established in the territory of the receiving State only with that State's consent.

2. The seat of the consular post, its classification and the consular district shall be established by the sending State and shall be subject to the approval of the receiving State.

3. Subsequent changes in the seat of the consular post, its classification or the consular district may be made by the sending State only with the consent of the receiving State.

4. The consent of the receiving State shall also be required if a consulate-general or a consulate desires to open a vice-consulate or a consular agency in a locality other than that in which it is itself established.

5. The prior express consent of the receiving State shall also be required for the opening of an office forming part of an existing consular post elsewhere than at the seat thereof.

United Nations.

While the establishment of Chinese Overseas Police Stations without the host country's consent represents a severe breach of territorial and judicial sovereignty - even if they were to provide "only" consular services such as the renewal of passports or driver's licenses, as <u>articles 2 to 5 of the 1963 Vienna Convention</u> <u>on Consular Relations</u> expressly establishes -, according to PRC statements, some countries have explicitly agreed to their set-up and local law enforcement, as well as the Chinese embassies and/or consulates, closely cooperate with the stations in those locations. In other countries, while such consent is (or appears) absent, PRC authorities seem to have (ab-) used existing bilateral policing cooperation mechanisms to further their clandestine goals. While the focus of both the initial investigation and this follow-up is on the establishment of unofficial – illegal – overseas police service stations without host countries' awareness, we also look into the establishment of host country approved operations, for further background on general developments.

Consent

Safeguard Defenders and other human rights organizations have frequently denounced the complicity of certain governments in the repatriation of individuals to the People's Republic of China without regard for internationally established standards of due process and protection mechanisms. As outlined in *Involuntary Returns*, such methods consist of the entrapment or luring of individuals to countries from where repatriation is easier, or even kidnappings with the aid of the third country's authorities, in addition to harassment in host countries by agents and "persuasion" operations. Evidence of such cases have been found also in relation to the Chinese Overseas Police Stations (See part 3. "Persuasion to Return" Operations).

In this regard, while the establishment of overseas outposts with the consent of the host

country and the cooperation of that outpost with the local law enforcement agencies may indeed provide a useful service to both communities, they are a reason for severe concern and – <u>much like bilateral extradition</u> <u>treaties</u> – these agreements should put those most at risk from PRC persecution on high alert when considering travel to those countries.

According to <u>an article on the Nantong</u> <u>Government's website that has since been</u> <u>made inaccessible but which content is still</u> <u>available on Legal Daily</u>, the Nantong Overseas and Domestic Police Linkage Service Center - with the support of the Public Security International Cooperation Department – signed a bilateral police cooperation memorandum with the police department of Dobroesti in **Romania**, and reached a consensus on police cooperation with the police in Johannesburg (**South Africa**) and Lusaka (**Zambia**). They further state that they had established direct contact with the **Angolan** and **Cambodian** police, while sending overseas security patrol teams to "carry out field research and security guidance".

(Ab)use of Bilateral Agreements

The abuse of multi- or bilateral cooperation agreements by the PRC is not a novel feature. Safeguard Defenders and other organizations have frequently denounced the ongoing abuse of international policing cooperation mechanisms such as INTERPOL or the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to both instill a wider sense of fear within dissident and other persecuted communities, as well as to legitimize the PRC's domestic judicial system despite its blatant violations of internationally recognized norms and standards. Of particular concern in this regard are also bilateral agreements between national law enforcement and PRC actors, as these may

dissuade those targeted by illicit operations from reporting. In addition they often enhance local law enforcement's sense of trust in their PRC counterparts, especially if not instructed on the rapidly expanding use and means of transnational repression.

Moreover, in the case of the establishment of Chinese Overseas Police Stations in countries that did not give (or have not acknowledged giving) consent, it appears such a bilateral police cooperation agreement may have directly contributed to the European "pilot runs" of both Wenzhou (2016) and Qingtian (2018) stations in **Italy**.

Pechino, 27 apr. - Scienza, cultura e sicurezza in primo piano, oggi a Pechino, dove si svolgono i lavori della sesta sessione congiunta del Comitato Governativo Cina-Italia, presieduta dal ministro degli Esteri cinese, Wang Yi, e dal ministro degli Esteri italiano, Paolo Gentiloni, giunto oggi nella capitale cinese per una missione di tre giorni. Italia e Cina hanno firmato oggi alla Diaovutai State Guesthouse, nella parte occidentale della capitale cinese, quattro accordi di cooperazione bilaterale, tra cui un memorandum d'intesa per la cooperazione sotto il profilo scientifico e tecnologico per lo sviluppo sostenibile e il programma esecutivo di collaborazione culturale tra Italia e Cina per gli anni 2015-2019. La cooperazione tra Italia e Cina si estende anche al settore dei farmaci, dei dispositivi medici e della cosmetica, oggetto di un altro accordo relativo al piano d'azione per il triennio 2015-2017. Un ultimo memorandum d'intesa, poi, è stato siglato in tema di sicurezza, tra Italia e Cina. per l'esecuzione di pattugliamenti congiunti di polizia nell'ambito della lotta al terrorismo, alla criminalità organizzata internazionale, al traffico di migranti e alla tratta di esseri umani.

AGI, 27 April 2015.

On 27 April 2015 - one year after the Ministry of Public Security's launch of operation Fox Hunt and the launch year for operation Sky Net - then Italian Foreign Minister Paolo Gentiloni signed four bilateral cooperation agreements

with his counterpart Wang Yi, among which a Memorandum for Joint Police Patrols

"in the ambit of the fight against terrorism, international organized crime, illegal migration and human trafficking".



From 2 to 13 May 2016, the <u>first Joint Police</u> <u>Patrols take place in Rome and Milan</u>. Upon their return the four men composing the PRC police team are met by Vice-Minister of Public Security Meng Hongwei, who will soon thereafter also become President of INTERPOL before his month-long disappearance under suspicious circumstances – presumably in the CCDI's *Liuzhi* black jails – and his following conviction to thirteen years in prison on corruption charges. His wife remains under police protection in France for fears of forceful repatriation.



Precisely in that same timeframe – May 2016 – Wenzhou's Public Security Bureau reportedly "piloted the establishment of a Chinese Overseas Police contact point" in Milan, Italy.

By August of that year, it establishes two additional contact points in Prato (Italy) and Paris (France).



In July 2017, <u>then Italian Vice-Minister of Interior</u> <u>Filippo Bubbico signed a bilateral Security</u> <u>Cooperation Agreement</u> with a delegation of the PRC Ministry of Public Security led by counterpart Xia Chongyuan: *"In the ambit of the consolidated friendship between the two countries of ancient civilizations, the initiative aims to intensify the fruitful relations between its respective public security bodies."* For Bubbico, the agreement follows the *"significant importance of the joint police patrols"*, while Xia expressed the "fundamental value of today's agreement in the ambit of the Strategic Sino-Italian Partnership, with a reinforcement of bilateral security cooperation". The exact content of the agreement remains undisclosed.

The second joint police patrols were held in four Italian cities in 2017, including Naples. Deemed a *"complicated security environment",* <u>what Chinese police officer Li Xiang and his</u> <u>colleagues perform that year was "more</u>

specific and with a more significant effect":

"With the assistance of the local gendarmerie, the joint patrol team successively visited the governor of Naples, the mayor of Naples and other dignitaries. In the end, under the coordination of Li Xiang, the representatives of the local Chinese businessmen and the military police department reached a consensus: the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the local military police will each send a security liaison officer to be responsible for solving security cases involving the Chinese community [...] A security meeting is held every two weeks, and the two sides sit down to discuss security issues. At the same time, with the support of the local Chinese chamber of commerce, Li Xiang also set up a team that is similar to China's "community crime prevention team" (治安联防队) for them and added a video surveillance system in the Chinese residential area to effectively deter crimes. 'We exported and promoted the domestic community policing model in Italy'."

On 18 December 2017, then Italian Foreign Minister Angelino Alfano signed a joint communiqué with Wang Yi in Beijing, applauding the July agreement and the success of the joint police patrols. The communiqué further celebrated the *"significant progress in bilateral judicial cooperation, agreeing to further strengthen existing mechanisms of extradition, mutual assistance in civil, commercial and criminal matters, and to increasingly promote exchanges of experiences and best practices in the fight against corruption."*

In 2018, for the third joint police patrols in Italy from May 28 to June 18, the *Ministry for Public* Security "entrusted the Zhejiang Provincial Public Security Department to form a team": "Ten police officers, including Chen Yin (Lishui Public Security Bureau) and Chen Qi (Qingtian Public Security Bureau), conducted joint patrols with the Italian police in four cities: Rome, Milan, Venice and Prato, Italy, entering the Chinese community and Chinese-funded enterprises, promoting the pilot 'police station' and anti-telecom fraud promotion." Elsewhere, the Euro Chinese Daily reports they hoped that "in addition to protecting the safety of Chinese tourists," through the third joint police patrol "China hopes to learn from the Naples model and introduce the Chinese community policing model into Prato".



On 12 June 2018, <u>according to Xinhua</u>, the "unveiling ceremony of the Rome 'Police Station' was held during the Sino-Italian Police and Overseas Chinese Cooperation and Exchange Conference at the Federation of Overseas Chinese in Rome." An active participant in the meeting was Giuseppe Moschitta – then Commander of the Esquilino Police Force, current head of the Italian State Police Press Office – <u>who was captured</u> on a propaganda video applauding the establishment together with Italian police colleagues present at the scene. By December 2018, the Qingtian (Zhejiang Province) Procuratorate had successfully set up six overseas stations in Italy, reportedly headed by Ye Xianping, director of the Italian Overseas Liaison Station of Qingtian County People's Procuratorate. The move was applauded in a speech by Wang Fuguo, Consul General of the Chinese Consulate General in Florence. Xinhua described it as "one of the most significant achievements of the joint Sino-Italian police patrols".

To date, despite having the largest number of liaison outposts on its soil, the Italian government is among the very few European countries that has not yet publicly announced an investigation into the Chinese Overseas Police Stations or declared their illegality. In a September statement to *II Foglio*, the Interior Ministry under the former Draghi Government said they *"were of no particular concern"*. The joint Sino–Italian police patrols were interrupted in 2020, following the outbreak of the Covid 19 pandemic. No official announcements regarding the future status of the security agreements have been made.

Similar joint police patrols agreements on European soil were also started in <u>Serbia (2019)</u> and <u>Croatia (2018)</u>.

Ch 4. Overseas Stations and "Persuasion to Return" Operations

The prior investigation *110 Overseas* contained evidence on two persuasion to return operations - including a Fox Hunt target conducted through the Qingtian overseas stations in Madrid (Spain) and Belgrade (Serbia), and the <u>Qingtian Public Security</u> has issued a statement that its overseas police service stations have led to a breakthrough in the overseas pursuit of fugitives, <u>including in a</u> <u>Fox Hunt operation</u>.



New evidence indicates that the Wenzhou overseas police service station in Aubervilliers, Paris, was involved in a persuasion to return operation: The leader of the station established in 2018 by the Overseas Chinese Federation and the Public Security District

of Ruian District in Wenzhou - is Hu Renai,

founder of the Sino-French Garment Industry Chamber of Commerce. *"In October 2019, I was also entrusted by the domestic public security organs to help persuade a criminal who had been absconding in France for many years to return to China through many visits,"* Hu said to Chinese media in an interview in October 2021.



作为服务"走出去"企业和广大海外侨商、侨胞的重要桥梁和纽带,2016年以来,南通市海内外警侨联动服务中心发挥资源集合 协作的平台优势,构筑警侨联动服务体系,为广大"走出去"企业和人员提供防疫指导、安全保障和便捷服务。截至目前,该中心步 置各类求助和案件120余起,协助抓获劝返犯罪嫌疑人80余名,发布预警提示1500余条。

Jiangsu Belt and Road Portal, 18 July 2022.

In addition, in July 2022, <u>Nantong authorities</u> report that since their establishment the **Nantong Police and Overseas Linkage stations** have assisted in the capture or persuasion to return of 80 "criminal suspects" to China, without specifying from which countries or which overseas stations may have been involved.



南通"猎狐2018"抓获境外经济逃犯11名

2018年10月18日 10:23:49 | 来源: 南通网

 $A^+ | A^-$

昨天,记者从市公安局获悉,南通市公安经侦部门精心组织开展"猎狐2018"专项行动, 实现历史性突破,截至目前共抓获境外经济犯罪逃犯11名,提前数月完成年度追逃目标,再 创境外追逃佳绩。



Ourjiangsu.com, 18 October 2018.

In one example provided elsewhere, <u>a Fox Hunt</u> <u>target surnamed Gan reportedly fled to Angola</u>. In August of 2018 the Nantong Public Security Bureau repeatedly contacted the Angola Nantong Chamber of Commerce running the Angola overseas linkage station to ask for their "assistance and support", after which "Gan's thinking changed", preparing the ground for when Wu Zhongcan, Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of the Municipal Public Security Bureau, travelled to Angola for police cooperation. After the latter's "knee-toneck conversation" with Gan, the man was successfully persuaded to return to China and surrender. That year, Nantong's Public Security services' 2018 Fox Hunt activities reportedly resulted in the return of eleven "overseas economic fugitives".

Ch 5. Overseas Liaison Personnel

The status of the overseas liaison "personnel" remains elusive. Language across reports from the different jurisdictions consistently speaks of their "hiring" (聘请), and <u>the personal account of</u> <u>the above-cited Hu Renai</u> at the Paris Wenzhou station states he left his prior professional activities to cover the needs of the station, but no conclusive evidence has been retrieved demonstrating payment for services rendered. Without added context, the Chinese wording could be translated in various ways: ranging from contracted to hired or appointed. In any case their elevation in role provides a dangerous added level of legitimization and power to the selected United Front Work "overseas leaders" to command and control the overseas community.

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A <u>People's Public Security Daily article from</u>

<u>23 May 2019</u>, cited in *110 Overseas*, states: "at present, the Qingtian County Public Security Bureau has hired 135 Qingtian overseas Chinese leaders and presidents of the Overseas Chinese League as directors, deputy directors and liaison officers of the centers." In the second picture, we see a retrieved certificate of appointment for Xia Hailong as the person in charge of the Qingtian overseas Chinese police service station in Stockholm for a period of three years, stamped by the Qingtian Public Security Bureau and signed by the Qingtian police bureau chief, which following Swedish media scrutiny was removed from the <u>website</u> <u>of the association</u> in Stockholm but remains <u>available on its archived version</u>.

开启"警+侨"合作模式

聘请海外华侨志愿者。推选聘请19名责任感强、法律功底实、海外声望高、热心公 益为侨服务的温州籍侨领担任海外警侨之家联络点联络员,为众多华侨提供海外联系、 政策解答、在线见证等服务。组建国内精干团队。成立由出入境管理大队、户政基础大 队、重点侨乡派出所负责人和海内外侨领联络员组成的服务团队,合力实现警侨各守一 方,线上办公"专人专职"服务模式。

Central United Front Work Department website, 29 November 2017.

In November 2017, an article sourced from the <u>Central United Front Work Department</u> website reports on the *"selection and hiring* of 19 Wenzhou overseas leaders with a strong sense of responsibility, solid legal background, high overseas reputation, and enthusiasm for serving overseas Chinese as liaison officers of the Chinese Overseas Police Contact Points". It further goes on to cite the ambition of "achieving a dedicated personnel service model" for the police and overseas liaison officers.



The previously cited May 2022, LibaoTown (Haian County, Nantong City) initiative where "[...] the Libao Town United Front Work Office and Town Police took the lead [...] to establish the Libao overseas Chinese police service center in May 2022. [...] exploring a new model of 'using overseas Chinese to govern overseas Chinese, and police and overseas Chinese linkage', cites that at present: **"Representatives** of overseas Chinese and overseas students have been hired in the United States, Australia, South Korea and other places as overseas

liaison officers to cooperate with domestic officers both internally and externally."

The sources provided throughout this investigation as well as numerous others accounts by authorities or state-owned or controlled media (see for example the <u>2020</u> <u>commendation list of nine outstanding</u> <u>overseas liaison officers from the Nantong</u> <u>Public Security Bureau</u>) further provide lists of names linked to the overseas stations which may be of interest to local law enforcement authorities investigating the matter.

Ch 6. Involuntary Returns and Fox Hunt

The latest working report by the CCP's Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection published on October 27 of this year provides new numbers on its overseas pursuit of fugitives' activities. Combined with prior data released, between the start of operations in 2014 and October 2022 over **11,000 successful** Fox Hunt operations in 120 countries have been concluded. These are the type of operations that have been targeted by FBI investigations and three DOJ indictments over the past years. So far, no other country in the world has brought any known charges against such operations.



Repeated statements and statistics show the vast majority of those to be carried out through illegal "persuasion to return" methods. See for example a CCDI report in 2021, according to which between January and November 2021, operation Sky Net (of which Fox Hunt is part since 2015) recovered a total of 1,114 "fugitives", in which only 13 requests for international law enforcement cooperation and criminal justice assistance were made. Similarly, <u>data for 2018</u> shows that only 17 persons where returned via extraditions, out of a total of 1,335.




As a Shanghai Foreign Affairs official stated to Spanish newspaper El Correo in response to our September investigation: "The bilateral treaties are very cumbersome and Europe is reluctant to extradite to China. I don't see what is wrong with pressuring criminals to face justice ... " Further statements and numbers provided in this 2021 Southern Weekend interview with Professor Ren Jianming echo that sentiment. Previous research by Safequard Defenders on available statistics shows that only about 1% of "successful fugitive returns" are the fruit of formal extradition proceedings. The vast majority use one of the illegal methods in below graphic, severely infringing on other countries' territorial and judicial sovereignty, as well as universal human rights.

Local jurisdictions play an important role in persuasion to return operations, as evidenced by <u>China Court</u> in 2016:

"Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the Central Committee has stepped up international efforts to pursue fugitives, and deployed and strengthened the prevention and control of escape. [...] The Central Office for Pursuit and Fugitives, whose full name is the Central Anti-Corruption Coordination Group, includes the International Fugitive Repatriation and Asset Recovery Office, established in 2014. It includes eight member units, including the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the Supreme Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Security, the Ministry of Justice, and the People's Bank of China. Correspondingly, 31 provinces, autonomous regions and cities have established provincial offices for the pursuit of fugitives."

For more insight into the methodology of "persuasion to return" operations, operations Sky Net and Fox Hunt, as well as the roles of the Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection (or its state-front, the National Commission of Supervision) and the Ministry for Public Security, see <u>Safeguard Defenders'</u> <u>Involuntary Returns.</u>





The original investigation, <u>110 Overseas</u>, exposed China's massive campaign to "persuade" those accused of fraud- and related crimes to return to China, claiming to have returned some 230,000 people over 2021/2022, as well as the establishment of a network of clandestine overseas Chinese police service stations across five continents, run by select local police forces in China. [A revised edition released October 29 corrected an error, altered some text for correction, identified courtesy of Jeremy Daum, and added further sources.]





The **first comprehensive report** on China's Fox Hunt and Sky Net operations, run by China's Communist Party's anti-corruption watchdog CCDI and Chinese Ministry of Public Security, aimed at forcing highvalue targets to return to China. At the time of writing, the Fox Hunt operation claims over 11,000 successful returns of purported "fugitives" from over 120 countries. As numbers show, most of them are repatriated through "involuntary" return operations, ranging from threats to - or detention of - family back in China, sending covert agents abroad to harass targets in host countries, and direct kidnappings.



The first extensive **report on China's use of extradition requests** and how such extradition cooperation violates international treaties and undermines the rule of law commitments in the countries that cooperate with them. It also maps how the PRC abuses INTERPOL as part of its extradition-based manhunts and how attempts at extradition often serve political purposes. It also stands as a how-to manual on effective ways to stop extraditions to the PRC for legal practitioners.



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